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STRICTLY LIABLE FOR MISUSE OF
THEIR PRODUCTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The second amendment to the United States Constitution states that
"[a] well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed."' Subsequent to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, scholars,
judges, legislators, and the general public have struggled to interpret
this phrase and reconcile it with legislative attempts to regulate the
availability of various types of firearms.2 In Kelley v. R.G. Industries3
the Maryland Court of Appeals held manufacturers and marketers of
"Saturday Night Specials" 4 strictly liable to innocent persons injured
or killed by the criminal use of their product.' In creating the common
law action, the Maryland court departed from past judicial determina-
tions6 by devising a method to guarantee compensation for innocent
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. For articles discussing the second amendment and gun control issues, see Ash-
man, Handgun Control By Local Government, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 97-111 (1982);
Beschle, Reconsidering the Second Amendment: Constitutional Protection For a Right of
Security, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 69-104 (1986); Gottleib, Gun Ownership, A Constitutional
Right, 10 N. DKY. L. REV. 113-40 (1982); Teske & Hazlett, A Scale For the Measure-
ment of Attitudes Toward Handgun Control, 13 J. CRIM. JUST. 373-79 (1985); Note, The
Right to Bear Arms and Handgun Prohibition: A Fundamental Rights Analysis, 14
N.C.L. REV. 296-311 (1983); Note, Do Victims of Unlawful Violence Have a Remedy
Against Handgun Manufacturers: An Overview and Analysis, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 967-
95.
3. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
4. The term "Saturday Night Special" describes a small, cheap, easily concealable,
and poorly made handgun. Id. at 144-45 n.8, 497 A.2d 1153 (1985) (citing 118 CONG.
REC. 21, 27-29 (1972)); United States v. Looney, 501 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1974); York v.
State, 56 Md. App. 222, 467 A.2d 552 (1983), cert. denied, 299 Md. 137, 472 A.2d 1000
(1984); R.G. Industries, Inc. v. Askew, 276 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
5. 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
6. The Kelley court chronicles a litany of attempts by plaintiffs to impose strict
liability on handgun manufacturers and marketers, and the subsequent rejection by the
Washington University Open Scholarship
348 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:347
victims7 and implement the state's public policy regarding "Saturday
Night Specials."8
Prior to Kelley the courts refused to hold the manufacturer or mar-
keter of a handgun strictly liable for the injuries or deaths caused by
criminal use of the weapon.9 Plaintiffs usually argued two theories of
liability: the "abnormally dangerous activity" theory ° and the "abnor-
mally dangerous product" theory."1 Courts, however, consistently re-
fused to hold handgun manufacturers and marketers liable under either
theory for injuries to innocent persons caused by the criminal use of
their product. 2
II. ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY
Under the "abnormally dangerous activity" theory, a person or cor-
courts of the theories advanced by plaintiffs in these actions. Id. at 132-40, 497 A.2d at
1147-50. While most courts rejected strict manufacturer and marketer liability in toto,
one federal district court recognized the possible validity of a strict liability claim. See
Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983). The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, overturned that determination in Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp.,
762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985), by rejecting the district court's language suggesting the
possible application of the "abnormally dangerous activity doctrine."
7. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of compensation.
8. See infra notes 82, 84 and accompanying text for a discussion of public policy.
9. Discussion of the applicability of strict liability to manufacturers and marketers
of handguns dominates many scholarly writings. For examples of articles supporting
the application of strict liability, see Siegel, Liability of Manufacturers for Negligent
Design and Distribution of Handguns, 6 HAMLINE L. Rnv. 321 (1983); and Turely,
Manufacturer and Suppliers Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 41
(1982). For examples of articles opposing the imposition of strict liability, see Bridge-
water, Legal Limits of a Handgun Manufacturer's Liability for the Criminal Acts of
Third Persons, 49 Mo. L. REV. 830 (1984); and Mackarevich, Manufacturers' Strict
Liability for Injuries from a Well-Made Handgun, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 467
(1983).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977).
11. Id. § 402A.
12. For examples of cases rejecting the "abnormally dangerous activity" theory, see
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington & Rich-
ardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Riordan v. International Armament Corp.,
132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); and Burkett v. Freedom Arms, 299 Or.
551, 704 P.2d 118 (1985).
For examples of cases rejecting the "abnormally dangerous product" theory, see Mar-
tin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Riordan v. Inter-
national Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Patterson v.
Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985); and Richman v. Charter
Arms Co., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985)
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poration engaged in an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activ-
ity may be held liable for a person's injuries caused by the dangerous
activity.13 The "abnormally dangerous activity" doctrine recognizes
the liability of a participant in that activity even if the participant exer-
cised reasonable care to prevent the occurrence of injury. 4 To impose
liability on the participant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing
the abnormally dangerous nature of the activity.
When determining what constitutes an abnormally dangerous activ-
ity, courts apply a six part standard to evaluate the nature of the activ-
ity conducted by the plaintiff. A court will consider the following
factors: (1) the probability that someone will be harmed; (2) the possi-
bility that the resulting harm will be great; (3) the existence of the risk
even if the defendant exercises reasonable care; (4) the uniqueness of
the activity; (5) the appropriateness of the activity with respect to
where it occurred; and (6) the value of the activity to the community
compared to its dangerousness.' 5 If a plaintiff proves the aberrant and
unacceptable nature of an activity through the application of these fac-
tors, the court will hold the defendant liable for the plaintiff's injuries
due to the defendant's participation in this "abnormal" activity.
16
Courts have refused to extend the concept of an "abnormally dan-
gerous activity" to include the manufacturing or marketing of hand-
guns. The courts have taken various approaches in handgun cases.
Some courts have examined whether the activity was appropriate for
the !:cation where the activity took place. The courts interpreting this
factor have refused to apply the doctrine unless the alleged ul-
trahazardous activity occurred on or was somehow related to land
owned or occupied by the alleged tortfeasor. 7
These courts held that no such connection exists in handgun manu-
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 520.
16. Id. § 519.
17. Maryland adopted this limitation in Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 176
Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939), which held the defendant not liable when earth fell into the
plaintiff's pond. The Kelley court reaffirmed this requirement, citing as an example of a
possibly abnormally dangerous activity the fact situation in Yommer v. McKenzie, 255
Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969). In Yommer the defendant gas station owner used
faculty underground storage tanks to hold his gasoline. Id. at 221, 257 A.2d at 139.
Those defective tanks leaked petroleum into the water supply of a populated area. The
Yommer court held the defendant liable because the hazard had some relationship to
the defendant's use of his land.
1987]
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facturer liability cases. 18 In Mavilla v. Stoeger Industries19 a federal
district court employed a different approach and ruled that the state
legislature's decision not to ban handguns precludes classifying the
manufacturing and marketing of handguns as an abnormally danger-
ous activity.2" Finally, in Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc. 21
the Seventh Circuit indicated another basis for excluding the manufac-
turing and marketing of handguns as an abnormally dangerous activ-
ity. The court interpreted Illinois law to limit the application of the
"abnormally dangerous activity" theory to instances in which the al-
leged tortfeasor's ultrahazardous activity related to the use of an in-
strumentality, rather than to its production or sale.22
III. ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS PRODUCT
The second predominant theory advanced by injured victim plain-
tiffs in actions against handgun manufacturers finds its source in sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.23 According to
section 402A, a manufacturer is liable for injuries caused by his prod-
uct if the plaintiff can prove the following: (1) the product was defec-
tive when the manufacturer sold it; (2) the defect was unreasonably
dangerous; (3) the defect was the cause of the injury; and (4) the prod-
uct was expected to and did reach the consumer without a substantial
change in its condition. 24 The courts apply this standard to defects in
both product design and production.25 The courts are split, however,
as to what standard should apply in determining the existence of a de-
18. See Richman v. Charter Arms Co., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (example of the
application of land-relation requirement in a handgun manufacturer's liability case);
Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293
(1985) (explicit rejection of the existence of any property connection in handgun manu-
facturer's liability case).
19. 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1983).
20. Id. at 110. The court held that a state decision to allow possession of handguns
precluded imposing strict liability on handgun manufacturers under product liability for
the death of third party. Id.
21. 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984).
22. Id. at 1203-04. Under Illinois law, a handgun is not an unreasonably dangerous
product and liability is not imposed on the manufacturer of a product that is not defec-
tive. Id. at 1204.
23. See supra note 12 for cases in which § 402A has been argued by plaintiffs in
handgun manufacturer liability cases.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
25. Id.
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fect and whether the defect was unreasonably dangerous.26 The courts
apply either the "consumer expectation"" test or the "risk/utility"
test.28
A. Consumer Expectation Test
Under the "consumer expectation" test, the trier of fact must deter-
mine whether the ordinary, ultimate consumer would consider the
product unreasonably and dangerously defective.29 A defect exists if
the product left the seller's control in a condition unexpected by and
unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate consumer.30 Courts determine
the unreasonableness and dangerousness of the defect in light of the
expectations of the reasonable consumer and his expected use of the
product.31
B. Risk Utility Test
The risk/utility test originated in the California Supreme Court's de-
cision in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.32 Under the "risk/utility"
theory, the court applies a two-step evaluation.3 3 The court must first
26. Kelley, 304 Md. at 136-37, 497 A.2d at 1148-49. States accepting the existence
of alternative theories include California (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.
3d 414, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978)); Illinois (Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
77 Ill. 2d 434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979)); and Massachusetts (Back v. Wickes Corp., 375
Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978)).
27. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
29. 304 Md. at 135, 497 A.2d at 1148. The Maryland court first articulated this test
when it adopted § 402A in Phipps v. General Motor Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955
(1976). The Phipps court stated, "both these conditions [defective and unreasonably
dangerous] are explained in the official comments [to section 402A] in terms of con-
sumer expectations." Id. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959.
30. 304 Md. at 135, 497 A.2d at 1148.
31. Id.
32. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). In Barker the plaintiff
was a heavy machine operator who sued a machine manufacturer for injuries he suf-
fered when the manufacturer's machine malfunctioned. Id. at 418-20, 573 P.2d at 446-
48, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228-30.
33. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The court noted that "[a]
product may be found defective in design, so as to subject a manufacturer to strict
liability for resulting injuries, under either of two alternative tests." Id. The court can
choose to apply the "consumer expectation" test, in which "a product may be found
defective ... if [the] plaintiff established that the product failed to perform as safely as
an ordinary consumer would expect." Id. The alternative test provided by the court is
actually the "risk/utility" test. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
1987]
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decide if the product proximately caused the injury.3 4 The court then
determines if the value of the product's current design outweighs its
potential to cause harm.3 5
Attempts to hold manufacturers and marketers of handguns liable
through the application of the "abnormally dangerous product" theory
have consistently failed.36 The courts have completely rejected the the-
ory's application to handgun manufacturers and marketers, though
often failing to distinguish which standard they applied to the case.
Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft exemplifies a court's rejection of the
"abnormally dangerous product" theory. 37 In Patterson a federal dis-
trict court completely rejected the plaintiff's section 402A design de-
fect claim. 38 The court found that no design defect existed because the
gun performed according to its intended design by discharging a bullet
with deadly force. 9 Other courts have expressed the same opinion in
similar cases. 4'
In Kelley v. R. G. Industries the Maryland Court of Appeals categori-
cally rejected the use of both the "abnormally dangerous activity"4
and "abnormally dangerous product"42 doctrines. In Kelley, Olin Kel-
34. 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. Under this alternative
standard, a plaintiff can prove a product's defectiveness if "[he] demonstrates that the
product's design proximately caused his injury." Id.
35. Id. According to Barker, the second step requires the defendant "to establish,
in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risks of danger inherent in such design." Id.
36. See Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 304 Md. 124, 138, 497 A.2d 1143, 1149 (1985).
The court stated, "this [rejection of the application of the abnormally dangerous prod-
uct theory] has been the consistent conclusion in other jurisdictions which have con-
fronted the issue." Id.
37. 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985). In Patterson the survivor of a man killed
during a holdup sued the manufacturer of the handgun used during the commission of
the crime. Id.
38. Id. at 1212.
39. Id. The court stated "a gun, by its very nature must be dangerous." Id.
40. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Har-
rington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Riordan v. International
Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Richman v. Charter
Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'don other grounds, Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
41. 304 Md. 124, 133, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985).
42. Id. at 138-39, 497 A.2d at 1149-50. For a discussion of the previous failures of
the "abnormally dangerous activity" and "abnormally dangerous product" theories, see
supra notes 6, 12, 20, 40 and accompanying texts.
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ley sustained gunshot wounds during an armed robbery.4 3 Kelley and
his wife brought an action against the marketer44 and manufacturer 45
of the gun that caused his injuries.4 6
The federal district court4 7 found no applicable Maryland prece-
dents and, therefore, certified a series of questions 8 for the Maryland
Court of Appeals.49 The Maryland court reduced the issues to three
basic questions: the liability of handgun manufacturers in general,5"
the liability of manufacturers of "Saturday Night Specials" in particu-
lar,5 and the determination of whether the handgun used against Kel-
ley was a "Saturday Night Special." 52
43. 304 Md. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144.
44. The West German Rohm Gesellschaft Corporation designed and marketed the
handgun used in the robbery. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1145.
45. R.G. Industries, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Rohm GeseUschaft, manu-
factured the handgun in its Miami, Florida plant. Id.
46. Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145.
47. Id. R.G. Industries requested removal of the case from the Maryland state
courts to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Id.
48. Maryland law provides for such a certification in the Uniform Certification of
Question of Law Act. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-601 (1984).
49. 304 Md. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145. The court heard oral arguments and decided
that some issues raised in arguments did not fall within the scope of the certification
order. The court ordered the plaintiff to return to the district court to obtain a new
certification order, which expanded the scope of the order and allowed the court to
address other issues it deemed appropriate. Id. at 130, 497 A.2d at 1146.
50. Id. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146. Specifically, the court asked, "Is the manufacturer
or marketer of a handgun, in general, liable under any strict liability theory to a person
injured as a result of the criminal use of its product?" Id.
51. Id. The second question was: "Is the manufacturer or marketer of a particular
category of small, cheap handguns, sometimes referred to as 'Saturday Night Specials,'
and regularly used in criminal activity, strictly liable to a person injured by such hand-
guns during the course of a crime?" Id.
52. Id. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146. The court stated that the trier of fact should
resolve whether the Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG385, serial number 0152662,
falls within the category referred to in the second question by looking at factors such as
the gun's accuracy, barrel length, concealability, quality of workmanship, cost, and
marketing techniques used by the manufacturer, and whether the gun fell within the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms regulations of handguns banned from im-
portation into the U.S. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159-60. Once the trier of fact estab-
lishes that the gun was indeed a "Saturday Night Special," then liability may be
imposed against anyone in the marketing chain up to the manufacturer. Id. at 158, 497
A.2d at 1160.
1987]
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IV. APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY TO HANDGUN
MANUFACTURERS IN GENERAL
In answering the question of the liability of handgun manufacturers
in general, the Maryland Court of Appeals closely tracked the discus-
sions and rationales of the courts that had previously addressed the
question. 3 The Kelley court rejected the "abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity" theory because Maryland had not extended the theory's applica-
tion to include tortious activities not related to land owned or operated
by the alleged tortfeasor.54 According to the court, a Maryland court
must evaluate the abnormality and dangerousness of an activity in rela-
tion to the occupation and location of the land where the activity takes
place.55 The court found that no such relationship existed between the
dangers inherent in the criminal use of handgun and any occupation or
ownership of land.56 Thus, the court refused to apply the "abnormally
dangerous activity" theory.57
The court further rejected the application of the "abnormally dan-
gerous product" doctrine" by repudiating the applicability of both the
"consumer expectation ' 59 and the "risk/utility ' 6 tests to Kelley's
claim. The court rejected the "consumer expectation" test, stating that
a consumer should reasonably expect a handgun to discharge a bullet
with deadly force.6 In the court's opinion, the "risk/utility" test also
53. Id. at 132-34, 497 A.2d at 1146-50.
54. Id. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147. For a discussion of this land relation requirement,
see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
55. 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
56. 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147.
57. Id. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a
discussion of other jurisdictions that have rejected the "abnormally dangerous activity"
doctrine.
58. 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
59. Id. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148. For a discussion of the "consumer expectation"
test, see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
60. 304 Md. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1149. For a discussion of the "risk utility" test, see
supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
61. 304 Md. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148. The Maryland courts have accepted the
"consumer expectation" theory, first articulated in Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,
278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), as the state standard. The Kelley court felt the
''consumer expectation" test failed because the plaintiffs missed the distinction between
the handgun's normal function, which can be dangerous, and a handgun defectively
designed or manufactured that causes injuries through its malfunction. 304 Md. at 136,
497 A.2d at 1148. In this instance, a consumer should reasonably expect a handgun to
fire a bullet with enough force to harm someone, as that is the handgun's normal func-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/16
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failed because the gun worked exactly as designed and assembled by its
manufacturer.62 The court, therfore, found no liability based on the
"abnormally dangerous" theory.63
V. APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY TO MANUFACTURERS OF
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS
The Kelley court, though rejecting strict liability for handgun manu-
facturers in general,' did not reject the Kelleys' damage claim against
the specific handgun manufacturer and marketer. While the Maryland
court interpreted existing Maryland law as failing to provide the Kel-
leys with a remedy, the court recognized the flexibility of the common
law as a basis for fashioning some relief for Kelley and others injured
by handguns. 65 The court, however, noted that any relief must corre-
spond to the public policy of the state regarding handgun ownership,
possession, and use.
66
The court of appeals interpreted Maryland's handgun laws as effec-
tuating a general prohibition against the wearing, carrying, or trans-
porting of handguns.67 The same law, however, provides various
tion. Id. An action would exist only for injuries caused by design or manufacturing
defect that causes an unexpected discharge or other malfunction. Id.
62. 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149. The Maryland court addressed the
"risk/utility" test even though no decision of the court has ever relied on its application.
Id. at 137-38, 497 A.2d at 1149. The court interpreted language in Phipps as giving it
the option of considering the "risk/utility" standard. The Phipps court stated: "[I]n
some circumstances, the question of whether a particular design is defective may de-
pend upon a balancing of the utility of the design and other factors against the magni-
tude of that risk." 278 Md. at 348, 363 A.2d at 961. In Kelley the court stated that the
"risk/utility" test applies only when the product fails to work in a manner intended by
its design. 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149. Because the gun worked properly, the
court found the "risk/utility" test inapplicable and thus the manufacturer was not liable
under § 402A. Id.
63. 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
64. Id. at 132-39, 497 A.2d at 1146-50. The court rejected the two primary theories
to hold manufacturers and marketers liable. Id. For other theories rejecting liability of
handgun manufacturers, see Linton v. Smith & Wessen, 127 Ill. App. 3d 676, 469
N.E.2d 339 (1984) (complaint dismissed because no common law duty existed for man-
ufacturer to control distribution of weapon); Bennett v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co.,
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (handgun manufacturers not liable for criminal
acts of third parties when specific defect not alleged).
65. 304 Md. at 140-41, 497 A.2d at 1150-51.
66. Id. at 141, 497 A.2d at 1151.
67. Id. Under the Maryland Code, "any person who shall wear, carry or transport
any handgun ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b)
(Supp. 1984).
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exceptions to the flat prohibition of handguns.6" The court interpreted
the existence of these exceptions to indicate a legislative intent not to
ban all handgun possession or use.69 According to the court, holding
all handgun manufacturers and marketers strictly liable for injuries
caused by the criminal use of their product would, contrary to Mary-
land's public policy, limit the availability of all handguns.7°
While rejecting strict liability for all handgun manufacturers and
marketers in general, the Kelley court determined that an exception to
the general public policy of controlled possession exists for the "Satur-
day Night Special."71 The Maryland court found that both the United
States Congress and the Maryland General Assembly treat the "Satur-
day Night Special" as a unique species of handgun.72 The court recog-
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 36B(c)(1), (3)-(5) (1982). These exceptions allow
possession by law enforcement personnel, military personnel, hunters, and sportsmen,
and for home and business protection. Id. Another part of the code permitted handgun
possession by those who meet certain age and character requirements and prove to the
Maryland State Police the existence of a good and substantial reason to carry a hand-
gun. Id. § 36B(c)(2) (1982).
69. 304 Md. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1152-53.
70. Id. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1153. Implicit in this statement lies a concern for the
chilling effect of strict liability imposition on the availability of handguns. In Martin v.
Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984), Judge Pell stated that
"[i]mposing liability for the sale of handguns, which would in practice drive manufac-
turers out of business, could produce a handgun ban by judicial fiat in the face of the
decision of the legislature [to allow handgun possessoin]." Id. at 1204.
71. 304 Md. at 144-47, 497 A.2d at 1153-54. The court determined that Maryland's
public policy did not encompass the possession and use of handguns that clearly had no
legal use. Id. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158. The Kelley court then decided that "Saturday
Night Specials" fit into this category due to their characteristics of easy concealability,
cheap materials, and poor workmanship. Id. The federal district court in Mavilla v.
Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1983), suggested that "Saturday Night Spe-
cials" may exist as a separate class from the class of handguns in general. Id. at 110 n.2.
The idea of carving out a special niche for a particular dangerous product within a class
generally accepted by society also occurred in Moning v. Alfano, 400 Mich. 425, 254
N.W.2d 759 (1977), which held the manufacturer of a slingshot liable for injuries
caused to a third person by the user.
72. 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158. At the federal level, the Gun Control Act of
1968 prohibits the importation of any firearm not approved by the Department of
Treasury. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 925(a) (1984). The Secretary of the Treasury promulgated
regulations barring the importation of a certain category of firearms that includes the
"Saturday Night Special." See 27 C.F.R. § 178.112(c) (1987). Section 178.112(c) states
in pertinent part:
No firearm shall be placed on the Importation List unless it is found that (1) the
caliber or gauge of the firearm is suitable for use in a recognized shooting sport,
(2) the type of firearm is generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily
adaptable to such use, and (3) the use of the firearm in a recognized shooting sport
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/16
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nized that the criteria of Congress and the Maryland legislature
defining what constitutes an acceptable handgun does not include
handguns that possess the primary characteristics of the "Saturday
Night Special."7 3 In light of this exclusion, the Kelley court concluded
that neither Congress nor the Maryland General Assembly intended to
afford "Saturday Night Specials" the same status granted to other
handguns and firearms under their respective laws.74
After finding that "Saturday Night Specials" do not fall within the
class of handguns whose possession the Maryland legislature permits,
75
the court decided it could then fashion a common law remedy, consis-
tent with Maryland's public policy, for innocent victims injured by
"Saturday Night Specials." 76 The court decided that because "Satur-
day Night Specials" fall outside the statutory scheme regulating the use
of handguns, holding the weapon's manufacturer and marketer strictly
liable for injuries to innocent persons is consistent with Maryland's
public policy.
77
The Kelley court found the strict liability remedy reasonable in light
will not endanger the person using it due to deterioration through such use or
because of inferior workmanship, materials or design.
Id. For a discussion of the relevant Congressional reports and Treasury investigations
placing the "Saturday Night Special" in a category of illegitimate weapons, see Kelley,
304 Md. at 147-53, 497 A.2d at 1154-57.
The court interpreted the policy of the state of Maryland to contain prohibition of
"Saturday Night Specials." Id. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158. The court first noted that
Maryland's public policy on handguns closely coincides with federal policy. Id. at 153,
497 A.2d at 1157. The court then cited instances in which handgun possession and use
are allowed under the Maryland Code. Id. The court noted, however, that a handgun
used in the commission of a crime did not fall within the scope of protected handgun
use. Id. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158. Thus, the Kelley court determined that handguns
primarily suited for criminal use had no legitimate purpose and were therefore contrary
to Maryland's public policy. Id.
73. 304 Md. at 144-46, 497 at 1153. The court found that the primary characteris-
tics of the "Saturday Night Special" were its short barrel, light weight, easy con-
cealability, low cost, poor quality, and unreliability. Id. at 145-46, 497 A.2d at 1153.
74. Id. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158.
75. Id. at 153-54, 497 A.2d at 1158. The primary use of "Saturday Night Specials"
is criminal and the possession of a handgun for use in criminal activity does not fit
within Maryland's list of exceptions. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(c)(1982). There-
fore, the "Saturday Night Special" falls within Maryland's general handgun prohibi-
tion. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b) (Supp. 1986). See supra notes 67-68 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Maryland handgun law.
76. 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. See also supra notes 67-70 and accompany-
ing text.
77. 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
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of its determination that the manufacturers and marketers of "Satur-
day Night Specials" know or should know of the primary, criminal
nature of their product's use.7 8 The court concluded that the imposi-
tion of strict liability on the manufacturers and marketers of this
unique type of handgun did not violate Maryland or federal policy con-
cerning handgun possession because their primary use was for criminal
or unprotected activity.
79
The court in Kelley v. R. G. Industries achieved two laudable accom-
plishments. First, the Kelley court provided compensation for inno-
cent victims of criminal acts by allowing the victim to sue the
manufacturer or marketer of the instrumentality that caused the plain-
tiff's injury. In many instances, the victims in these cases have no
means of recovery because the assailant is either unidentified or judg-
ment-proof.8 o The court recognized, however, that the assailant is not
the sole defendant in actions involving gunshot injuries, and held that
the company which exacerbated the victim's injury by producing an
inexpensive weapon with no legitimate purpose should compensate
those victims for injuries caused by their product."s
78. Id. at 155-56, 497 A.2d at 1158. The court cited examples of the manufacturer's
sales personnel classifying a "Saturday Night Special" as a "ghetto gun" or stating that
"[the gun] sells real well, but between you and me, it's such a piece of crap I'd be afraid
to shoot it." Id. (citing Brill, The Traffic (Legal and Illegal) in Guns, HARPER'S, Sept.
1977, at 40). The court also noted a Michigan case that held a toy manufacturer strictly
liable for injuries caused by a slingshot produced by the manufacturer. See Moning v.
Alfano, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 754 (1977). The court in Moning found that the
manufacturer of a dangerous product could be held liable for injuries when the primary
purchasers were likely to misuse the product. Id. at 446-49, 254 N.W.2d at 759. See
Ivenson, Manufacturer's Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common Law Ap-
proach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 776 (1983) (argues for expansion of the application of
liability to handgun manufacturers).
79. 304 Md. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158. See supra notes 67-70, 75 and accompanying
texts.
80. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1984) (if the victim has been injured or attempts to recover damages from the user of
the handgun, the user is frequently unreachable or judgment-proof); Kelley v. R.G.
Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985); Patterson v. R.G. Industries, Inc.,
608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (instance of unidentified assailant).
81. 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. The court found such a requirement appro-
priate because the manufacturer and marketer of a "Saturday Night Special," who pro-
duces the instrumentality that caused the plaintiff's injuries, is "more at fault" than an
innocent victim. Id. The court also noted the potential criminal use of the product and
that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the potential criminal application
of his product. Id. at 156, 497 A.2d at 1159. The Kelley court found this knowledge
sufficient to hold manufacturers and marketers of "Saturday Night Specials" strictly
liable for injuries caused by their product. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
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The second accomplishment of the Kelley decision lies in its limita-
tion of the existence of a type of handgun repugnant to public policy.82
The Kelley decision effectively bans the production and marketing of
"Saturday Night Specials" in the state of Maryland through the use of
economic pressure.83 By making "Saturday Night Specials" expensive
to produce, their price will increase, thereby decreasing their availabil-
ity or making them too expensive to produce.8 4
The major criticism of the imposition of strict liability on the manu-
facturers of "Saturday Night Specials" comes from the impression that
the court overstepped its traditional role by creating legislation
through judicial fiat.85 This charge, however, fails to take into account
two important factors. First, both Congress and the Maryland legisla-
ture decided that "Saturday Night Specials" did not deserve the same
status as other handguns.86 Congress found that "Saturday Night Spe-
cials" do not have a legitimate purpose and that their availability
should be curtailed.87 Likewise, Maryland limited the acceptable uses
for handguns.88 The Kelley court, therefore, followed the intent of
both legislatures by distinguishing "Saturday Night Specials" from
other handguns through the imposition of strict liability for marketers
and manufacturers. Instead of legislating by judicial fiat, Kelley merely
articulates an actual ban implicit in legislative policy.
Second, the Kelley decision is narrow, therefore minimizing the
amount of any "legislating" attempted by the court. The court's opin-
ion explicitly avoids applying strict liability to handgun manufacturers
82. See supra notes 71-74, 78-79 and accompanying texts.
83. See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir.
1984). In Martin the court stated that the imposition of strict liability on handgun
manufacturers would effectively ban their production by making the manufacturer act
as an insurer against damages produced through use of the weapon. Id.
84. Judge Cudahy, in his Martin concurrence, interpreted this economic argument
not as an attempt to create a judicial ban on handgun sales through economic pressure,
but as an attempt to internalize the cost of handgun use by including the cost of hand-
gun fatalities and injuries. Id. at 1206. He stated, "the imposition of strict liability on
the manufacturer and seller should not be viewed as an attempt to drive handguns from
the market-for the courts, an improper goal. Rather, it is an effort to place the costs
inherent in handguns on the users rather than on the victims." Id.
85. See id. at 1204. In Martin the court stated that "imposing liability for the sale
of handguns, which would in practice drive manufacturers out of business, would pro-
duce a handgun ban by judicial fiat, in the face of the decision of the legislature." Id.
86. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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in general, and focuses solely on "Saturday Night Specials." Because
these weapons exist as an outcast in the handgun regulations, the nar-
rowness of the holding will discourage any attempt by courts to expand
the decision's specific findings through judicial activism.
Congress and state legislatures have explicitly found the existence of
"Saturday Night Specials" contrary to public policy. By applying
strict liability to the manufacturers and marketers of "Saturday Night
Specials" for injuries caused by their product during the commission of
a criminal act, the Maryland Court of Appeals took a reasonable and
important step to enforce its state policy regarding "Saturday Night
Specials." The court provided a common law remedy to compensate
innocent victims injured by criminal acts when no such relief was avail-
able. The Kelley decision will help eliminate a weapon repugnant to
our society, thereby effectuating the intent of both the United States
Congress and the Maryland General Assembly. Finally, and most im-
portantly, the Maryland court successfully reconciles constitutional
guarantees established over 200 years ago with changes in our society,
protecting the "right to bear arms" while providing relief for those in-
jured from the abuse of that right.
James Dimos
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